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L Facts
In May 1997 the Government charged Charles Sell ("Sell") with submitting
fictitious insurance claims.' A federal magistrate judge ordered a psychiatric
examination of Sell that found him competent to stand trial, but noted that Sell
mayexperience another psychotic episode in the future.2 The judge granted Sell
bail? Subsequently, a grand jury produced a "superceding indictment charging
Sell and his wife with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid fraud, and
1 count of money laundering."4
In 1998 the magistrate held a bail revocation hearing because the Govern-
ment claimed that Sell sought to intimidate a witness. At the hearing, the judge
described Sell's behavior as out of control, involving screaming insults and
spitting on the judge. A psychiatrist reported that Sell's condition had worsened.
After considering the report and other testimony, the magistrate revoked Sell's
bail.'
In April 1998 the grand jury issued another indictment. This indictment
charged Sell with the attempted murder of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") agent who arrested Sell and an individual who planned to testify against
him in the fraud case. The court joined the fraud and attempted murder cases
for trial.6
In 1999 Sell asked the magistrate to reconsider his competency. The
magistrate sent Sell to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners.
Doctors examined Sell and determined that he was not competent to stand trial.
The magistrate ordered Sell to remain at the Medical Center for treatment and
a determination of the probability that Sell would attain a mental capacity that
would allow him to proceed to trial.'
1. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2003); se 18 U.S.C S 1035(a)(2) (2003)
(describing the offense of making false statements relating to health care).
2. Sdl, 123 S. Ct. at 2179. Sell had a long history of mental illness accompanied by "epi-
sodes" that preceded this charge. Id The Court noted several episodes between 1982 and 1997
when Sell's mental illness required hospitalization and treatment. Id Additionally, the Court noted







Two months after Sell's arrival, the Medical Center staff recommended that
Sell be medicated with antipsychotic drugs, but Sell refused to take therm8 The
staff sought permission from institutional authorities to medicate Sell against his
will.9 A reviewing psychiatrist held a hearing and authorized the forced medica-
tion of Sell." He determined that medication was necessary because Sell was
mentally ill and dangerous and because it would make Sell competent to stand
trial." The reviewing psychiatrist noted that the determination of Sell's danger-
ousness was based on threats outside the prison.2 He asserted that Sell would
be able to function in an open prison population."
Next, the Medical Center reviewed the determination of its reviewing
psychiatrist. 4 A Bureau of Prisons official upheld the decision that Sell would
benefit from the antipsychotic medication." The official "concluded that
antipsychotic medication represents the medical intervention 'most likely' to
'ameliorate' Sell's symptoms" and"that other less restrictive interventions' [were]
'unlikely to work' "16
In July 1999 Sell filed a motion contesting the Medical Center's right to
medicate him against his will.'7 In September 1999 the federal magistrate judge
who ordered Sell to the Medical Center held a hearing. Sell introduced much
of the same evidence that he had introduced in the first two administrative
hearings.' 9 He added two bodies of evidence.2" First, a witness explored the
question of the medication's effectiveness." Second, doctors testified about
events that had occurred in the Medical Center after the administrative proce-
dures concluded.22
8. Sd 123 S. Cr. at 2179.
9. Id
10. Id at 2179-80. At the hearing, the reviewing psychiatrist considered Sell's past history
of mental illness, Sell's current beliefs, the staff's medical opinions and concerns, an outside medical
expert's opinion, Sells own views, and the views of laypersons who knew him. Id at 2180.
11. Id at 2180.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Sd, 123 S. Ct. at 2180.
15. Id The Bureau of Prisons official considered the evidence at the initial hearing, Sell's





20. SdJ 123 S. Cc. at 2180.
21. Id
22. Id Sell's doctors testified that Sell repeatedly approached nurses at the Medical Center
and had various "boundary-breaching" incidents. Id The doctors testified that, given Sell's prior
behavior, diagnosis and current beliefs, these incidents were not harmless and, when combined with
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In August 2000 the magistrate found that forcibly medicating Sell was the
only way to render him not dangerous and competent to stand trial.23 The
magistrate issued an order authorizing the involuntary administration of anti-
psychotic drugs but stayed the order to allow Sell to appeal to the federal district
Court.
2 4
In April 2001 the district court reviewed Sell's record and found that the
magistrate's conclusion that Sell was sufficiently dangerous to warrant involun-
taryadministration of antipsychotic drugs was "clearlyerroneous." 25 "The court
limited its determination to Sell's 'dangerousness at this tinr to himself and to
those around him in his izMsiaieM ante'L' "26 Nonetheless, the district court
affirmed the decision of the magistrate that permitted the forced medication of
Sell, concluding that forced medication was the only way to render Sell compe-
tent to stand trial.27 Both the Government and Sell appealed.28
In March 2002 a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Crcuit affirmed the district court's decision.29 The Eighth Crcuit held
that" 'the evidence [did] not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself
or others at the Medical Center.' "30 The Eighth Crcuit also affirmed the district
court's order requiring medication of Sell in order to render him competent to
stand trial.31 The majority of the panel found that because of the seriousness of
the fraud allegations against Sell, the government had an" 'essential interest in
bringing [Sell] to trial.' "32 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's
Sell's inability and unwillingness to stop this inappropriate conduct, indicated that he was a safety
risk inside die institution. Id The doctors noted that Sell had been moved to a locked unit. Id
23. Id at 2180-81. The magistrate specifically found that the government had shown that
"anti-psychotic medication [was] the only way to render [Sell] less dangerous"; that newer drugs
would reduce the risk of serious side effects; that the benefits of medication outweighed the risks;
and that there was a "substantial probability" that medication would restore Sell to competency.
Id
24. Id at 2181.
25. Id The magistrate noted that Sell had "been returned to an open ward." Id
26. SAZ 123 S. Ct. at 2181.
27. Id The district court noted that antipsychotic drugs were necessary and medically
appropriate and that the drugs represented the onlyhope for rendering Sell com tent to stand trial.
Id Additionally, the court stated that the administration of the antipsychotic drugs was necessary
to serve the government's compelling interest of adjudicating Sell's case. Id The district court
further related that it would be "premature" to consider whether "the effects of medication might
prejudice [Sell's] defense at trial." Id
28. Id at 2181.
29. Id; seeUnited States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560,572 (8th CGr. 2002) (affiri the district court
decision that Sell "may be involuntarily medicated for the purpose of rendering him competent to
stand trial").
30. Sd 123 S. Ct. at 2181 (quoting Sd!, 282 F.3d at 565).
31. Id
32. Id (quoting Sd 282 F.3d at 568).
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finding that there was no less intrusive means of accomplishing the trial objec-
tive.33 Sell appealed this decision on the ground that" 'allowing the government
to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to render him
competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses,'" violated his Fifth Amend-
ment right to liberty.34
II. Hddig
The United States Supreme Court reaffirned the holdings of Ribzm v
Newda5 and Wasbingtn v Har!?6 that, in limited circumstances, the Constitution
allows the government to administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily.37 Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the Constitution permits the government involuntarily
to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious
criminal charges for the sole purpose of rendering that defendant competent to
stand trial only if the following conditions are met: (1) the court finds an impor-
tant governmental interest; (2) the court concludes that antipsychotic medication
will significantly further the state's interest in seeing justice served; (3) the court
determines that involuntary medication is necessary to further the state's inter-
ests; and (4) the "administration of the drugs is medically appropriate" and in the
patient's best interest.3" The Court ordered the judgment of the Eighth Circuit




Initially, the Supreme Court considered whether the Eighth Circuit had
jurisdiction to decide Sell's appeal.40 The district court's judgment, from which
Sell appealed, was a pre-trial order by a magistrate judge that required Sell to
33. Id (citing Sd!, 282 F.3d at 571).
34. Id (quoting Brief for Petitioner at i, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (No. 02-
5664)).
35. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
36. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
37. Sd4 123 S. Ct. at 2178, 2183; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 US. 127, 138 (1992) (reversing
Riggins's conviction and remanding the case because the trial court allowed forced medication
"without finding a substantial state interest for doing so"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227
(1990) (holding that "the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a
serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself
or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest").
38. Sd/, 123 S. Ct. at 2184-85.
39. Id at 2187.
40. Id at 2181-82.
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receive medication involuntarily.4' "The order embodied legal conclusions
related to the Medical Center's administrative efforts to medicate Sell"; these
efforts resulted from Sell's commitment pursuant to the magistrate's order
seeking to determine Sell's competency to stand trial. 2
The law generally requires a defendant to wait until the end of trial to obtain
review of a pre-trial order.43 However, the Court noted that the law makes
exceptions to this rule." The Court found that the district court's order in this
case fell within the "collateral order" exception."
In Sta& v Bo*}I 4, the Court held that a defendant can appeal a pre-trial
order setting bail excessively high as a "collateral order."47 This appeal is now
statutory in the federal system.4" The collateral order issue only arises in the
absence of a statutory right to appeal. The Court has held that a preliminary or
interim decision is appealable under the collateral order doctrine when it: (1)
"conclusively determine[s] the disputed question"; (2) "resolve[s] an important
issue" that is "completely separate from the merits of the action"; and (3) "is
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."49
The order in Se/i" 'conclusively ... determin[ed] the disputed question'"
whether Sell had a legal right to avoid forced medication."s The order "
'resolv[ed] an important issue" because involuntarymedication raises important
constitutional questions.5" Additionally, whether Sell should have been forced
to undergo medical treatment against his will was a matter that was" 'completely
separate from the merits of the action,' " namely, whether Sell was guilty or
innocent of the crimes with which he was charged. 2 Finally, the issue of whether
41. Id The magistrate judge received his authorityto enterapre-trialorderfromadelegation
of the district court. Id; se 28 U.S.C S 636(b)(1)(A) (2000) (allowing a judge to designate a
magistrate judge to hear and determine certain pretrial matters).
42. Sd 123 S. Ct. at 2182.
43. Id
44. Id; se also United States v. Ferebe, 332 F.3d 722, 726 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
refusal to strike a death notice is appealable as a collateral order); Jessie A Seiden, Case Note, 16
CAP. DEF. J. 207 (2003) (analyzing United States v. Ferebe, 332 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 2003)).
45. Sd, 123 S. C. at 2182.; se28 U.S.C S 1291 (2000) (authorizing federal courts of appeals
to review only "final decisions of the district courts"). A final judgment has been interpreted to
mean a judgment that terminates a criminal proceeding. Sd4 123 S. Cr. at 2182.
46. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
47. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951).
48. Se 18 U.S.C S 3145(c) (2000) (allowing appeal from a release or detention order).
49. Sd4 123 S. C. at 2182 (quoting Coopers &Lybrand v. Livesay, 43 U.S. 463, 468 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id (quoting Oxpens & Librag 43 U.S. at 468).
51. Id (quoting Cxlr & L3brag 43 U.S. at 468).
52. Id (quoting CQpers & L)brar 43 U.S. at 468). The Court noted that this question is
distinct from questions concerning trial procedures. Id
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Sell should have been involuntarily medicated was" 'effectivelyunreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.' " If Sell was forced to take medication before
trial, the harm which he sought to avoid would already have occurred.'
The Supreme Court concluded that the district court order from which Sell
appealed was appealable as a "collateral order," thus the Eighth Circuit had
jurisdiction to hear it." Consequently, the Court concluded it had jurisdiction to
review Sell's claim that involuntary medication would violate his constitutional
rights.5 6
B. Fon~d A dristratin f A n s Dng
1. 7he Stand dfr For JA ddniistration
In Rizmw and Harper, the Court set forth the framework for determining
when the Constitution permits the forced medication of defendants."7 Read
together, these cases indicate that the Constitution "permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand
trial, but only if" it is: (1) a medically appropriate treatment; (2) "substantially
unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of a trial"; and (3)
"taking account of less invasive alternatives, [ ] necessarysignificantlyto further
important governmental trial-related interests."" The Court noted that this
standard only permits involuntary administration of drugs for trial competency
purposes in limited instances. 9
Before turning to the competency question, the Court emphasized that
there are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced adminis-
tration of drugs can be justified on grounds other than competency to stand
trial ° First, an inquiry into whether medication will render an individual less
53. Id (quoting Cxopen & Lbiwr 43 US. at 468).
54. Id (quoting CQ0er & Lybwra, 43 U.S. 468). The Court noted that Sell's argument that
forced medication maymake his trial unfair is fundamentallydifferent than an argument that forced
medication did make his trial unfair. In Sell's case, what mayhappen at trial is irrelevant and a "final
decision" appeal would come too late for Sell to have a ruling on his rights. Id at 2183.
55. Sdl, 123 S. Ct. at 2183.
56. Id A three Justice dissent argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction in this case because
the district court never entered a final judgment, nor did the question appealed fall under 28 U.S.C
S 1291 or S 1292. Id at 2187-88 (Scali, J., dissenting).
57. Id; s&Rikms, 504 U.S. at 138 (reversing and remanding Riggins's conviction because the
trial court permitted the forced medication of Riggins without taking into account his liberty
interests, thus causing a consequent possibility of trial prejudice); Haper, 494 U.S. at 221 (allowing
the state to treat a mentally ill inmate, who is dangerous to himself or others, with antipsychotic
medication so long as the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest).
58. Sd, 123 S. Ct. at 2184.
59. Id The Court noted that such instances "maybe rare." Id
60. Id at 2185.
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dangerous is more "objective and manageable" than an inquiry into whether
medication is permissible to render a defendant competent." The Court sug-
gested that medical experts might find it easier to determine whether medication
is appropriate and necessary to control a defendant's dangerous behavior than
to weigh the potential harms and benefits of medication and apply them to
questions of fairness and competency to stand trial.62 Additionally, the Court
noted that in civil proceedings where a patient is dangerous or lacks competency
to make decisions regarding his health, involuntary medication is often justified
on these grounds.63 Everystate provides ways in which caretakers or guardians
can make decisions authorizing medication when it is in the best interest of the
patient if the patient lacks the capacity to make such a decision." "If a court
authorizes medication on an alternative ground [e.g., health or dangerousness],
the need to consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely dis ap-
pear."6 The Court noted that, in most instances, a court, when asked to render
a decision regarding involuntary medication for trial competence, should deter-
mine if the Government has first sought permission for forced administration
of drugs on alternative grounds, such as dangerousness or health.66 If the
Government has not sought to pursue this alternate avenue, the Supreme Court
urged the lower courts to ask "whynot."67 The findings underlying a determina-
tion that medication cannot be forcefully administered because the defendant is
not a danger and his health is not in jeopardy can still be relevant and useful to
aid a judicial decisionmaker when ruling on forced medication for trial compe-
tency.
68
The Supreme Court in Sdl broke the standard from Harper and R izin into
four considerations that a court must explore before ordering forced medication
solelyfor trial competency.69 First, the court must find an inti angovernmental
interest at stake.'0 The government has an important interest in bringing an
offender accused of serious personal or property crimes to trial for security
reasons."' However, the Court noted that courts must consider the facts of the
61. Id (citing Rizir, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
62. Id
63. Id
64. Sd, 123 S. C. at 2185 (citing ALA. CODE SS 26-2A- 102(a), 26-2A- 105, 26-A2-10 (1992);
ALASKASTAT. S 13.26.105(a), 13.26.116(b) (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14-5303, 14-
5312 (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. SS 28-65-205, 28-65-301 (Michie 1987)).
65. Id at 2185-86.
66. Id at 2186.
67. Id
68. Id
69. Id at 2184-85.




individual offender's case when evaluating the government's interest in prosecu-
tion.' Special circumstances, such as the lengthy confinement that may result
when a defendant refuses to take medication voluntarily, may lessen the impor-
tance of the government's interest." These factors should be balanced against
both the defendant's and the government's interest in a fair and timelytrial. The
government has an important interest in assuring that a defendant has a fair trial,
as a trial delaymayresult in lost evidence, faded memories, and other occurrences
that may affect a trial's outcome.74
Second, forced medication must signiicandfintxr state interests.7 ' The
court must find that administering the drugs will render the defendant competent
to stand trial, while at the same time determine that the administration of the
drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects that would interfere with the
defendant's ability to aid his counsel in preparation of trial.7" The court noted
that such interference would render the trial unfair.7
Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is nmssary to
further the government's interests and that there are no less intrusive treatments
likelyto achieve substantiallythe same result.7 The court must also consider less
intrusive means of administering the drugs. 9 The Court proffered the example
of utilizing a court order backed by contempt sanctions as a less intrusive means
of accomplishing the medication goal."0 Finally, the court musl conclude, before
administration, that the drugs are nJiady ptpiate The defendant's medical
interests, as well as the interests of the state, must be considered when adminis-
tering a drug that could produce different levels of success and side effects.82
72. Id
73. Id The Court noted that if a defendant is mentallyill and refuses drug treatment, often
the defendant will have a lengthyconfinement in a mental institution. Id This confinement reduces
the risk that results from freeing a serious offender without punishment. Id
74. Id
75. Id
76. Sd 123 S. Ct. at 2184; see Rivz, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (listing reasons why forced
administration of psychiatric drugs can cause trial prejudice).
77. Sd, 123 S. Ct. at 2184-85.
78. Id at 2185. The Court noted that alternative non-drug therapies maybe effective for the
treatment of psychotic defendants for trial competency. Id
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id The Court defined "medically appropriate" as "in the patient's best medical interest
in light of his medical condition." Id
82. Id
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2. ApplicaimtoSell
The Supreme Court assumed that the Eighth Circuit was correct in finding
that the magistrate's conclusion that Sell was dangerous was "clearly errone-
ous."" Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit approved forced medica-
tion of Sell solelyin order to render him competent to stand trial.84 The Supreme
Court noted that it made the assumption that the district court and the Eighth
CArcuit correctly approved forced medication for competency reasons alone
because the Government did not argue, nor did the parties contest that matter. 5
However, the Court related that the record before it suggested the contrary.8 6
The Court ruled that, on the assumption that Sell was not dangerous, the
Eighth Crcuit erred by approving forced medication solely to restore compe-
tency.7 The Court noted that the magistrate found that forced medication was
not ordered on trial competency grounds alone, but rather because Sell was
dangerous and forced medication was "the only way to render the defendant not
darww and competent to stand trial" 8 Moreover, the Court noted that the
record from the hearing before the magistrate showed that the experts testified
primarily regarding Sell's dangerousness.89 Consequently, questions concerning
the side effects of the medication and whether medication was warranted on trial
competency grounds alone were not asked or answered." Failure to focus on
trial competence could have caused the lower courts' and administrative hearings'
judges to articulate the wrong result.9 The Court stated:
Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere
with comriunication with counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial
developments, or diminish the abilityto express emotions are matters
important in determining the permissibility of medication to restore
competence, but not necessarily relevant when dangerousness is
primriy at issue.92




87. Id at 2187.
88. Id
89. Sd 123 S. Ct. at 2187.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id (citing Rinz, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Finally, the Court noted that the lower courts did not consider that Sell had been
confined at the Medical Center for a long time and his refusal to take medication
could result in a lengthier confinement."
IV. Applwcxn W' Vizma
The United States Supreme Court's standard for forcible medication for trial
competency consists of several factors. Under Rig&n and Harper, the govern-
ment's burden to prove an, overriding state interest in order to medicate a
defendant involuntarily is eased by the fact that a defendant is dangerous to
himself or to others.94 Such a situation is constitutional because the involuntary
treatment is an" 'accommodation between an inmate's libertyinterest in avoiding
the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State's interest in
providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate
suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others.'"" The
Riggbs Court went further and suggested that involuntary medication could be
constitutional if the state could not adjudicate guilt or innocence because the
defendant was incompetent and less intrusive means were unavailable.' Using
both Harper and Riggims, the Court in Sell articulated a set of factors that must be
met in order to justify such an invasion of the defendant's liberty. In Sed, the
Court did not specificallylimit the application of such an analysis to anyparticu-
lar set of defendants, such as non-violent or non-capital. However, due to the
nature of capital cases, courts will likely find that the government has a significant
interest in prosecution.
In Virginia, there is no forced medication statute that speaks directlyto trial
competency. Under Virginia Code section 19.2-169.2, the court, upon finding
that the defendant is incompetent, must order that the defendant receive treat-
ment to restore his competency.97 "Treatment" under the Virginia statute is not
defined.
Assume a case in Virginia where a defendant is found incompetent and
ordered to undergo treatment to restore his competency" The defendant's
93. Id The Court reasoned that Sell's confinement at the Medical Center reduced the
likelihood that he would commit future crimes, and although this does not eliminate the Govern-
ment's interest in prosecution, it does reduce it. Id
94. Id at 2185.
95. Sd 123 S. Ct. at 2183 (quoting Harpter, 494 U.S. at 236).
96. Id (citing Rizk, 504 U.S. at 135).
97. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-169.2 (Qichie Supp. 2003). Virginia Code section 37.1-134.21
addresses involmtary medical treatment as a civil matter. VA. CDE ANN. S 37.1-13421 (lfchie
Supp. 2003). It provides avenues by which the court can authorize involuntary medication when
it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is incapable of making an
informed decision and that the proposed action is in the best interest of the patient. Id
98. SseVA. ODE ANN. SS 192-169.1-1693 (Michie Supp. 2003) (outlining procedures for
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doctors decide that psychotropic drugs should be administered to restore his
competency, but the defendant refuses voluntarily to take the medication. The
defendant is not dangerous. The Commonwealth must take several steps to
obtain a court order to medicate forcibly the defendant."
First, the Commonwealth must file a motion asking the court to order
involuntary administration of the antipsychotic drugs to the defendant.'Oo In a
hearing on the issue, the Commonwealth would seek to present witnesses,
presumably from the hospital where the defendant is located, and other experts
to testify as to the defendant's mental state, prospect of competency without
medication, and other relevant data regarding the defendant's mental capacity.
Under Sdl, if the Commonwealth seeks to have antipsychotic drugs administered
to a defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render the defendant
competent to stand trial, the Constitution permits forced medication only when
there are important governmental interests that involuntary medication will
significantly further and the involuntary medication is necessary and medically
appropriate to further those interests.' The Commonwealth must demonstrate
these factors, as well as that the antipsychotic drugs are necessary and do not
have side effects that would hurt the defendant in trial preparation.
0 2
The next question that logically arises is whether the defendant has a right
to his own expert witnesses to challenge the testimony of the Government's
witnesses. In C wv lbd u Huske,"'0 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
when Ake v C*ahon' °il and Caldtat v Misissippi' s are read together, the
Commonwealth is required to provide indigent defendants "the basic tools of an
adequate defense."' ' After Husske, the indigent defendant seeking an expert
defendants who allege incompetency and are found to be incompetent).
99. The Court in Sd/ stated that "[we consequently believe that a court, asked to approve
forced administration of drugs for purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial,
should ordinarily determine whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for
forced medication" on dangerousness grounds. Sd, 123 S. C. at 2186. This statement implies that
an inquiry into the need for forced administration of medication for trial competency could occur
without a prior inquiry into dangerousness although the Court instructs lower courts to question
why such a dangerousness inquiry was not made. Id
100. Note that Virginia Code sections 19.2-169.1-169.7, dealing with trial competency, do not
refer to a defendant's dangerousness. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-169.1-169.7 (Michie Supp. 2003).
101. Sd, 123 S. C. at 2184-85.
102. Id
103. 476 S.E2d 920 (Va. 1996).
104. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
105. 472 US. 320 (1985).
106. Sw Commonwealh v. Husske, 476 S.E.2d 920,925 (Va. 1996) (extending Aketo allow
a defendant to request any kind of expert needed for the defendant to have the "basic tools of an
adequate defense" so long as the defendant can show a particularized need); se also Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 US. 68, 82-83 (1985) (discussing the showing that would entitle a defendant to
psychiatric assistance as a matter of federal constitutional law); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 US. 320,
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must show a particularized need for the expert. 7 One could argue that a
defendant who does not want to be forcibly medicated in order to become
competent to stand trial could show the Hsske particularized need because this
defendant could demonstrate to the court that his liberty interests would be
compromised if forcibly medicated. A defendant in this position deserves the
opportunity to rebut the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert. Once
forcibly medicated, a defendant would have no redress post-trial because his
liberty right to be free from medication would have already been violated. In
addition, one would assume that because the question here is the administration
of medication to the incompetent defendant, through the application of the Sel
factors, the burden is placed on the Commonwealth to prove bya preponderance
of the evidence that forced medication is essential.
If the court orders that the defendant be forcibly medicated, the next
question that arises is whether the Commonwealth orthe defendant can immedi-
ately appeal an adverse decision. In Sefl, an order bythe district court judge was
appealable to the Eighth Circuit as a collateral order because the harm com-
plained of could not be corrected after final judgment. In Virginia Code section
37.1-134.21, addressing cases involving civil competency, the Virginia legislature
provided for the de novo appeal of a magistrate's or judge's opinion to the circuit
court for the jurisdiction where the order was entered within ten days; any
decision of the circuit court could be appealed within ten days to the court of
appeals.""8 A court of appeals would likely use an abuse of discretion standard
because the circuit court's review was de novo.
A defendant can also raise the forced medication issue on appeal post-trial
or in a habeas petition. The defendant may argue that his constitutionally
protected libertyinterest was violated and that, due to side effects of the medica-
tion forcefully administered, he was unable to provide his counsel with the
assistance needed to be effective at trial. An action in habeas would allow the
court to address the defendant's unconstitutional deprivation of his liberty
interest.
V. cQdsaion
Due to the absence of statutory guidance on involuntary medication of
defendants for trial competency, there is a need for the Commonwealth to codify
legislation with respect to forced medication in the criminal context. In such a
statute, the legislature should include provisions for experts, appeals, proper
procedures, burdens of proof, and timing. Lacking statutoryguidance, practitio-
323 n.1 (1985) (finding that without more than a generalized statement of the need for an expert,
due process is not violated by a judge's determination not to grant the requested expert).
107. Htsske, 476 S.E.2d at 925.
108. VA. CODE ANN. S 37.1-134.21(K) (Mlchie Supp. 2003).
306 [Vol. 16:1
2003] SELL V UNITED STATES 307
ners are urged to argue that the timing, standard of proof, and provisions for
appeal that appear in the Virginia civil competency statute should serve as
guideposts, as theyplace the burden on the government to overcome the defen-
dant's liberty interest and provide for immediate appeal of an adverse decision.
Meghan I"H Morgan

